The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings

Citation:

Gao, Xiaohui, and Jay Ritter, 2010, The Marketing of Seasoned Equity Offerings, Journal of Financial Economics, 33-52.

Abstract:

In an accelerated seasoned equity offering (SEO), an issuer foregoes the investment bank’s marketing efforts in return for a lower fee. To explain why many issuing firms choose a higher cost fully marketed offer, we posit that the marketing effort flattens the issuer’s shortrun demand curve. Alternatively stated, with a fully marketed offer, the issuer is paying investment bankers to create demand, making the elasticity of demand at the time of issuance an endogenous choice variable. Empirical analysis shows that both the pre-issue elasticity of the issuing firm’s demand curve and the offer size are important determinants of the offer method choice. We find evidence of a large transitory increase in the elasticity of demand for issuers conducting fully marketed SEOs.

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